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NOTE 
 
WHEN THE HAIR MUST BE SPLIT: THE IMPORTANCE OF 
DISTINGUISHING BETWEEN OMISSIONS AND COMMISSIONS IN 
SEXUAL ABUSE CASES  
 
Clint Hamilton† 
 
ABSTRACT 
Under normal circumstances, a man who threatens witnesses of a crime to 
keep silent about its occurrence is as guilty as the principal who committed the 
crime in the first place. However, according to the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire, church elders who actively and deliberately threaten a mother into 
concealing the sexual abuse of her own five-year-old girl have not committed 
an active tort, but instead omitted to act, for which they cannot be liable. By 
failing to distinguish the active threat from the passive failure to report abuse, 
the New Hampshire Supreme Court gave Jehovah’s Witnesses elders tacit 
permission to engage in cover-ups with impunity, allowing them to be secure 
in the knowledge that the victims of their deceptions and manipulations would 
never have any chance to hold them accountable for the wrongs thus inflicted. 
Traditionally, courts are reluctant to impose liability for acts of omission. 
That reluctance is woven into the fabric of American law, and it is one that 
should be both affirmed and respected. However, where courts uphold the 
portrayal of affirmative acts of negligence as passive failures to act, they deny 
victims of sexual abuse the opportunity to recover damages from those who 
assisted the abuser in hiding his crimes. This occurred in New Hampshire 
because the court, hesitant to impose liability for inaction, did not even begin 
to consider whether the alleged incident contained inaction or action. This 
dismal result could have been avoided without making a change in existing 
law, and liability can in the future be imposed without expanding liability for 
acts of omission, as long as courts are able and willing to carefully and 
deliberately draw a line between an affirmative act and an act of omission. 
This Note will examine and explain the policies behind the limited liability 
framework traditionally applied to acts of omission. It will then examine how 
that framework was misapplied by the New Hampshire Supreme Court in a 
suit alleging the willful concealment of sexual abuse and will argue that the 
 
†   Clint Hamilton is a second-year J.D. candidate at Liberty University School of Law, 
specializing in Constitutional Law and appellate advocacy. He has a passion for tackling 
unresolved conflicts at the front edge of the law and developing well-reasoned syntheses of 
traditional, conservative legal doctrines and the modern demands of a rapidly changing 
concept of justice. 
342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd   107 5/13/20   7:35 AM
382 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2 
 
Court should have analyzed the case under a standard negligence framework. 
It will then explain how that framework would have provided justice for the 
victims without violating the policies behind limited liability for acts of 
omission.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are some crimes that by their very nature give rise to a feeling of 
confusion, horror, and consternation in the hearts of humans. The sexual 
assault of a five-year-old girl by her father is one such crime. When first we 
hear of an instance where that crime has been committed, we can hardly 
comprehend how any sort of man would even conceive of the act. 
Afterwards, it is impossible to communicate in any language the entirety of 
the horror that we feel for the sake of this unfortunate child and the burden 
she must bear for the rest of her life. For those who practice law in hopes of 
preventing (or at the very least mitigating) the very tragedy which has 
unfolded, there is a deep feeling of consternation at the inadequacy of the 
civil justice system.  
The heinous character of the crime, the sympathetic nature of the victim, 
and the helplessness of her plight cries out for justice in a system that at times 
appears ill-equipped to provide an adequate remedy. Far too often, well-
meaning attorneys and sympathetic judges find their hands seemingly tied 
behind their backs by longstanding principles of civil liability and due 
process. One potential arena in this fight is centered around whether 
individuals have a duty to report abuse that they know or suspect is taking 
place. 
The abuser’s most powerful enemy is the Samaritan who exposes him; but 
his most powerful ally is the common man who passes by in apathy. As one 
court wrote, “[C]hild abuse is more often than not committed in secret upon 
silent and powerless victims. It takes no leap of logic to conclude that the 
secretive commission of child abuse is likely to continue absent intervention 
by appropriate authorities to whom the abuse has been reported.”1 
Conversely, there is little question that at least some instances of abuse might 
have been prevented if someone had simply informed the appropriate 
authorities. This, in turn, has led some victims to sue persons who knew 
about the abuse but refused to intervene.2 
The biggest hurdle these victims face is the general principle that 
individuals are not subject to a general duty to act or intervene to prevent 
criminal acts (or other harm) against another person.3 Of course, there are 
 
1.   J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 812 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994). 
2.   See, e.g., Mayeux v. Charlet, 203 So. 3d 1030 (La. 2016). 
3.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 (AM. LAW INST. 1965). 
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several exceptions to this where affirmative duties are acknowledged.4 One of 
the most prominent characteristics of situations producing duties to act is 
some sort of relationship or interaction between the alleged non-actor and 
either the plaintiff or a third-party perpetrator.5 
As courts around the nation grapple with this question of whether to 
establish civil liability under the common law for failing to report sexual 
abuse, the answers and rationales have varied. Those jurisdictions which have 
upheld a common law cause of action tend to rely upon the existence of some 
special relationship between the defendant and either the victim or the 
abuser.6 This indicates that courts are unwilling to create an entirely new 
cause of action and instead seek to fit failure to report abuse under the 
existing nonfeasance framework. Where such a special relationship does not 
exist, unfortunately, the common law tends to provide no remedy. 
The reasonable solution for such a problem, of course, is for the 
legislatures to remedy through statute what the courts through judicial 
opinions cannot. Acting through the proxy of the legislature, the people may 
impose statutory civil liability where the courts, acting solely under the 
authority of the common law, lack the power to develop new causes of action. 
Recognizing this, some legislatures have acted. Many states have passed 
mandatory reporting statutes requiring certain professions or other 
categories of persons to report suspected or confirmed child abuse.7 
Unfortunately, the legislature cannot—or, on occasion, will not—act on 
every possible eventuality. Moreover, when victims fall into statutory gaps 
which leave them just out of reach of civil remedies, courts struggle to provide 
justice in an imperfect system through existing common law remedies. For 
instance, where a statute does not provide for a civil cause of action in the 
 
4.   See id. at § 314 cmt. a (summarizing exceptions to the general rule).  
5.   See, e.g., id. at § 314A (duty of affirmative action when a special relationship exists 
between the defendant and the injured party); id. at § 314B (duty of affirmative action toward 
an endangered or injured employee); id. at §§ 316–320 (duty of affirmative action when 
defendant has control of a third person); id. at §§ 321–322 (duty of affirmative action when 
previous or current action creates an unreasonable risk of harm or actual harm to another 
person); id. at §§ 323–324, 324A (duty of affirmative action upon the voluntary undertaking 
of a duty). 
6.   Cf. Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (duty to report exists where 
a fiduciary relationship was established between the plaintiff and the defendant); Marquay v. 
Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995) (duty to report existed because the student/teacher relationship 
created an affirmative duty to report); Bradley v. Ray, 904 S.W.2d 302 (Mo. Ct. App. 1995) 
(therapist’s special relationship with the patient created a duty to report where the therapist 
knew that the patient was sexually assaulting the patient’s daughter). 
7.   See CHILDREN’S BUREAU, MANDATORY REPORTERS OF CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT (2019). 
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event of violation, there is a substantial risk that victims will be left without a 
remedy against the people who ignored their plight.  
In 1967, the State of New Hampshire criminalized failure to report, but 
did not explicitly create a corresponding private right of action.8 When a 
victim asked the New Hampshire Supreme Court to rule otherwise in 
Marquay v. Eno, the Supreme Court indicated that the omission was 
deliberate, and no statutory cause of action would exist unless and until the 
legislature indicated an intent to create one.9 In Berry v. Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Society of New York., Inc.,10 however, the court encountered a much 
more nuanced set of circumstances. In Berry, a Jehovah’s Witness told 
multiple elders in her congregation that her husband was sexually assaulting 
her two daughters.11 Rather than report the abuse, the elders kept silent and 
pressured the mother to keep silent as well.12  
Years later, when the two girls sued the elders for negligence, breach of 
fiduciary duty, and willful concealment of abuse, the trial court used a 
combination of negligence law, cleric-penitent privilege, and the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment to justify dismissing all 
claims.13 A majority on the New Hampshire Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court’s ruling, but on other grounds, specifically ruling that the elders had 
breached no duty to the plaintiffs.14 The majority decision’s holdings on 
statutory negligence and fiduciary duty are not in dispute. However, the 
majority used only a partial standard in its common law negligence analysis, 
which resulted in an incomplete analysis and an erroneous conclusion.  
II. BACKGROUND 
Child victims of sexual abuse in New Hampshire suffer the same legal 
hurdles that exist in other jurisdictions when attempting to obtain a remedy 
from those who fail to report ongoing abuse. The nonfeasance framework in 
New Hampshire is adopted from the Restatement (Second) of Torts.15 In the 
words of the New Hampshire Supreme Court, “The duty to do no wrong is a 
legal duty. The duty to protect against wrong is . . . a moral obligation only, 
 
8.   N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2019). 
9.   Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d at 277–78. 
10.   Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124 (N.H. 2005). 
11.   Id. at 1125. 
12.   Id. at 1127. 
13.   Id. at 1126. 
14.   Id. at 1128. 
15.   Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104–05 (N.H. 1993). 
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not recognized or enforced by law.”16 Thus, there were large groups of people 
who had no duty to report abuse to the proper authorities. This, in turn, 
meant that there was little incentive to report said abuse. 
The New Hampshire legislature attempted to remedy this issue in 1979 by 
enacting a mandatory reporting statute that applied to numerous professions 
in the State.17 The statute made failure to report punishable as a misdemeanor 
in an attempt to create the previously missing incentive.18 Unfortunately for 
victims of sexual abuse, the legislature did not indicate a desire to create civil 
liability under the statute.19 As a result, even if an individual violated the 
statute by failing to report abuse and was criminally convicted of the 
violation, the victims could not receive a civil remedy for their injuries. 
This interpretation of the reporting statute was confirmed when students 
from the Mascoma Valley Region School District argued sixteen years later 
that the statute implied a private right of action for statutory negligence.20 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court rejected the students’ argument, citing 
a lack of evidence that the legislature intended to create such a cause of 
action.21 Although the Court did rule that the students’ suit could go forward, 
it did so based on common law claims of negligent supervision and negligent 
hiring by school officials, rather than via any claim for failure to report.22 
Thus, the lack of a remedy still persisted where no special relationship 
existed. 
When the court in Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, 
Inc. faced the question of whether a common law claim for failure to report 
abuse could be raised, the court addressed a question of first impression in 
New Hampshire.23 For the first time, the New Hampshire Supreme Court was 
faced with plaintiffs who asserted a blanket common law claim for failure to 
report (among other claims). Rather than following the strategy of Marquay 
in relying solely upon an established common law claim, the plaintiffs in 
Berry proffered a nonfeasance claim attempting to establish an affirmative 
duty to report the abuse.24  
 
16.   Dustin v. Curtis, 67 A. 220, 221 (N. H. 1907) (quoting Buch v. Amory Mfg. Co., 44 A. 
809, 811 (N. H. 1897)). 
17.   N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-C:29 (2019). 
18.   Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 276 (N.H. 1995). 
19.   See § 169-C:29. 
20.   Marquay, 662 A.2d at 275–76. 
21.   Id. at 278. 
22.   Id. at 278–81. 
23.   See Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1125–
26 (N.H. 2005). 
24.   Id. 
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Berry was a case that cried for a new cause of action, if such a case ever 
existed. The plaintiffs were sisters; their father had started sexually abusing 
them in a most sickening manner before either daughter was even six years 
old.25 His marriage was predictably decaying, and the two spouses went to the 
elders of their local Jehovah’s Witnesses Congregation (“Congregation”) for 
marital counseling.26 Over the course of this counseling, the plaintiffs’ mother 
alerted the elders “on ten to twelve separate occasions” that her husband was 
sexually abusing her daughters on a regular basis.27 
Instead of reporting the abuse as required under section 169-C:29, the 
elders covered it up. Even worse, they also pressured the plaintiffs’ mother to 
maintain the coverup, telling her to “be silent . . . and be a better wife.”28 The 
abuse halted in 1989, when the plaintiffs were eleven and six years old.29 Over 
a decade later, the two sisters sued both their father and the Congregation.30 
While the trial court dismissed the suit against the plaintiffs’ father under the 
statute of limitations, it allowed the suit against the other defendants to move 
forward.31 Thereafter, their father was not a party to the appeal.32 
The plaintiffs sought to revisit the claim of a private right of action under 
section 169-C:29, despite the court having thoroughly laid that claim to rest 
ten years before in Marquay.33 They also raised a claim for breach of fiduciary 
duty.34 Most significantly, however, they asked the trial court to recognize a 
new common law cause of action for failure to report sexual abuse.35 Pursuant 
to Marquay, the trial court dismissed the claim relying on a private right of 
action in section 169-C:29, but let the common law claim proceed.36 Later, 
though, the trial court dismissed all charges on the grounds of both penitent-
cleric confidentiality and the Establishment Clause.37 
The majority opinion in Berry briefly disposed of both the private right of 
action and fiduciary duty claims, and devoted most of its opinion to 
discussing whether the plaintiffs had a common law cause of action for failure 
 
25.   Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
26.   Id. at 1127 (majority opinion). 
27.   Id. 
28.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
29.   Id. 
30.   Id. at 1125–26 (majority opinion). 
31.   Berry v. Bible, No. 01-C-0318, 2003 WL 25739775, at *3 (N.H. Super. Feb. 06, 2003). 
32.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1125. 
33.   Id. at 1126. 
34.   Id. 
35.   Id. 
36.   Id. 
37.   Id. 
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to report the sexual abuse.38 The court devoted the majority of its analysis to 
a nonfeasance analysis considering whether the defendants had an 
“affirmative duty to aid [the plaintiffs],” and concluded that they did not fall 
within any exception that would have incurred such a duty.39 The court 
additionally declined to extend liability, and therefore denied all claims raised 
by the plaintiffs. 
Justice Dalianis dissented, arguing that the court erred in conducting only 
a partial analysis.40 She argued that the sheer foreseeability that the 
defendants’ actions would encourage and enable continuing abuse in itself 
formed a special relationship, and that the defendants thus may have been 
liable.41 She further argued that the facts of Berry were unique and would not 
create a risk of overextending liability.42 After addressing a number of other 
issues raised by the trial court (including the First Amendment issues), she 
concluded that the plaintiffs’ suit should have been allowed to proceed.43 
Because Berry was decided by the New Hampshire Supreme Court on non-
constitutional grounds, it was not appealed and remains binding authority 
within the State of New Hampshire. 
This Note begins by presenting the policies and rationale behind a limited 
nonfeasance framework (such as the New Hampshire Supreme Court applied 
in Berry). It then shows that the majority opinion erred in attempting to avoid 
those pitfalls by analyzing the facts solely under a nonfeasance framework. 
This Note further argues that while the dissent correctly recognized that the 
majority’s conclusion was incorrect and its analysis was incomplete, it also 
neglected to consider the possibility that the defendants had committed a 
misfeasance by acting in a manner that required and lacked due care.  
This Note elaborates on and applies the distinction between nonfeasance 
and misfeasance and argues that the defendants’ actions in this case were 
actions of misfeasance. This misfeasance should have subjected them to 
liability for their active attempt to prevent the plaintiffs from receiving 
assistance from other sources. This, in turn, opened them up to liability for 
their decision to not report the abuse.  
This Note further demonstrates that if the court had applied a standard 
misfeasance framework to the facts in Berry, the plaintiffs would have 
received a just remedy for the wrong inflicted upon them by the defendants. 
 
38.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1128–31. 
39.   Id. 
40.   Id. at 1131–32 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
41.   Id. at 1133. 
42.   Id. at 1134. 
43.   Id. at 1134–37 (addressing issues involving the religious privilege, the Establishment 
Clause, and the statute of limitations). 
342213-Liberty_Law_14-2_Text.indd   113 5/13/20   7:35 AM
388 LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 14:2 
 
Finally, it will argue that applying this rule to similar cases would provide 
more complete remedies for victims of abuse while avoiding both policy and 
constitutional pitfalls that creating a new tort of nonfeasance might incur. 
III. BERRY V. WATCHTOWER BIBLE AND TRACT SOCIETY OF NEW YORK, INC. 
A. The Facts  
Berry was a heart-breaking case where longstanding judicial principles 
seemed to pervert justice rather than promote it. The plaintiffs in Berry had 
both been physically and sexually abused by their father between 1983 and 
1989.44 During that time, both parents had been dealing with marital issues 
and attended counseling at their local Jehovah’s Witnesses congregation.45 
Separately from the counseling, the plaintiffs’ mother, Mrs. Poisson, told the 
elders between ten and twelve times that her husband had physically and 
sexually assaulted her daughters.46 The elders responded to Mrs. Poisson’s 
cry for help by dismissing her concerns and condemning her behavior as a 
wife.47 They also allegedly “admonished [her] not to speak to secular 
authorities upon the pains of disfellowship.”48  
The plaintiffs filed suit against the defendant Society and Congregation on 
four counts. They alleged common law negligence, statutory negligence 
under section 169-C:29, breach of fiduciary duty, and willful concealment of 
abuse.49 The trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants on the 
statutory negligence and fiduciary duty claims.50 It later dismissed the 
remaining claims (of common law negligence and willful concealment of 
abuse), asserting that the plaintiffs’ claims, “whether sounding in common 
law negligence or deceit, [were] ‘clerical malpractice,’” and that continuing 
to hear the case would violate the Establishment Clause.51 The plaintiffs 
appealed to the New Hampshire Supreme Court. 
B. The Majority: Nonfeasance, Therefore No Liability 
In a 2-1 decision, the court affirmed the dismissal of all counts, but used 
different reasoning than the trial court.52 As a result, the majority did not see 
fit to reach the Establishment Clause issue. Instead, the court held that (1) 
 
44.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
45.   Id. at 1127 (majority opinion). 
46.   Id. 
47.   Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
48.   Id. at 1129 (majority opinion). 
49.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1125–26. 
50.   Id. at 1126. 
51.   Id. 
52.   Id. at 1131. 
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section 169-C:29 did not create a private right of action, (2) the defendants 
had no common law duty towards the plaintiffs, and (3) no fiduciary duty 
existed to be breached.53 
1. Holdings and Disposition of Claims 
The majority opinion first addressed the statutory negligence claim, and 
summarily brushed it aside based upon its earlier decision in Marquay.54 
Then, it considered the common law and fiduciary duty claims. The court 
held that no fiduciary relationship existed between the plaintiffs and the 
defendants, and, therefore, that no fiduciary duty had been breached.55 The 
court also held that the defendants did not have a common law affirmative 
duty to act.56 As a result, the majority saw no need to reach a holding on the 
constitutional issue involved in the case, and relied upon other rationales in 
affirming the trial court’s dismissal of all claims.57 
2. Statutory Negligence and Fiduciary Duty Rationales 
The New Hampshire Supreme Court had already determined that section 
169-C:29 did not create a private right of action in Marquay v. Eno ten years 
before, and saw no reason to revisit the issue.58 In that case, high school 
students filed suit against the school for failing to report chronic abuse of 
students by a school employee, and one of the claims raised was for statutory 
negligence under section 169-C:29.59  
Although the court allowed other claims to proceed in that case, it 
dismissed the claim for statutory negligence.60 Under New Hampshire law, 
the Marquay court wrote, a criminal statute only created a private right of 
action if there was some indication that the legislature intended to do so.61 
The court noted that section 169-C:29 was not accompanied by any such 
indications, and therefore held that the statute did not create a private right 
of action.62 The Berry court declined to overrule Marquay and held that the 
plaintiffs could not claim statutory negligence as a cause of action.63  
 
53.   Id. 
54.   Id. at 1128. 
55.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1131. 
56.   Id. at 1130. 
57.   Id. at 1131. 
58.   Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272 (N.H. 1995). 
59.   Id. at 275–76. 
60.   Id. at 278. 
61.   Id. at 276–78. 
62.   Id. at 278. 
63.   Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d at 1124, 1128 
(N.H. 2005). 
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The Berry court also brushed aside the plaintiffs’ fiduciary duty claim, 
holding that a fiduciary duty only existed where “influence has been acquired 
and abused or confidence has been reposed and betrayed.”64 The court noted 
that nothing of the sort had occurred between the plaintiffs themselves and 
the defendants, as any relationships that existed involved the elders and the 
children’s parents (rather than the children themselves).65 Thus, the court 
affirmed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the plaintiffs’ breach of fiduciary 
duty claim.66 
3. Common Law Negligence Rationale 
The majority spent most of its analysis addressing the plaintiffs’ common 
law claim. Calling failure to report an allegation of nonfeasance, the court 
ruled that a duty to act to prevent foreseeable harm generally does not exist.67 
The court also listed three exceptions under which a duty to prevent criminal 
behavior could arise: (1) where a special relationship existed between the 
parties; (2) where special circumstances existed including situations where 
the defendant’s acts create an “especial temptation and opportunity” for the 
criminal misconduct; or (3) where the defendant voluntarily assumed a duty 
to act.68 
The plaintiffs only raised the first two exceptions as issues, so the court 
declined to analyze whether the defendants had voluntarily assumed a duty 
to report sexual abuse.69 The court found that the plaintiffs presented no 
evidence of a relationship with the defendants beyond a generic membership 
in the Congregation.70 Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, “membership and 
adherence to church doctrine by the plaintiffs’ parents [does not create] a 
special relationship.”71 Next, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that 
the defendants created a special opportunity for sexual abuse by failing to 
report it.72 The court held that the exception could not be met by “mere 
failure . . . to report . . . [or] improper advice concerning an appropriate 
response to . . . criminal activity.”73 Rather, the court held that some actual 
act must have taken place, and found that “[t]here is no allegation that the 
 
64.   Id. at 1131. 
65.   Id. 
66.   Id. 
67.   Id. at 1128. 
68.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1128. 
69.   Id. at 1129. 
70.   Id. 
71.   Id. 
72.   Id.at 1129–30. 
73.   Id. at 1130. 
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elders created any opportunity for Berry to abuse his daughters.”74 The court 
held that neither of the exceptions were met, and that therefore the 
defendants had no common law duty that could be breached.75 As a result, 
the trial court’s ruling was affirmed.76 
C. The Dissent: Foreseeability, Therefore Liability 
Justice Dalianis wrote a second opinion which concurred in part and 
dissented in part.77 While she agreed with the majority that there was no 
fiduciary relationship or statutory duty, she disagreed with the conclusion 
that the defendants had no common law duty.78 As a result, she also found it 
necessary to address the First Amendment grounds for the trial court. In 
doing so, she argued that the First Amendment did not bar a claim for failure 
to report under the circumstances.79 
1. Common Law Negligence 
She started by laying out a fourth exception under which a duty to act 
could be created—overriding foreseeability.80 She argued that the sheer 
foreseeability of the sexual abuse, when combined with the faulty advice 
given to Mrs. Poisson, created a special opportunity for the abuse to take 
place, thus creating a duty to act.81 Justice Dalianis also inferred that the 
abusive husband was present when Mrs. Poisson was ordered to stay silent 
and argued that this only increased the severity of the defendants’ conduct.82 
If true, she argued, then the defendants were creating a condition where the 
abuser was secure in the knowledge that he could continue to act with 
impunity.83 
2.        First Amendment Analysis  
Justice Dalianis also addressed the trial court’s decision to dismiss the 
claims on First Amendment grounds. The trial court construed the plaintiffs’ 
assertions as a claim for negligent counseling and invoked Lemon v. 
Kurtzman to state that investigating that claim would “excessively 
entangle[]” the government with religion in violation of the Establishment 
 
74.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1130. 
75.   Id. at 1131. 
76.   Id. 
77.   Id. (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
78.   Id.  
79.   Id. at 1135–36. 
80.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1132. 
81.   Id. at 1133. 
82.   Id. at 1133–34. 
83.   Id. 
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Clause.84 Dalianis argued that this analysis was flawed and proposed her own 
analysis under both the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses.85 
Addressing the Free Exercise Clause, Justice Dalianis applied the United 
States Supreme Court’s “neutral law of general applicability” standard.86 
However, she noted, before a government statute may be subjected to any 
form of scrutiny, the person claiming violation of the Free Exercise Clause 
must first demonstrate that the government’s conduct would burden a 
specific religious doctrine or practice.87 Observing that the defendants had 
not identified any such doctrine or practice that would be burdened by a 
finding of liability, Justice Dalianis claimed that the Free Exercise Clause was 
therefore not violated.88 
Turning then to the Establishment Clause, Justice Dalianis argued that the 
trial court misapplied the Lemon standard.89 The defendants had argued (and 
successfully persuaded the trial court) that any trial for liability would violate 
the excessive entanglements prong of Lemon because “any inquiry into the 
counsel given to [the plaintiff’s mother] . . . would require the trial court to 
evaluate religious doctrine and the quality and substance of religious 
counseling.”90 They further argued that this would be “a claim for ‘clergy 
malpractice,’ a cause of action which has not been recognized by any court.”91  
Justice Dalianis disagreed.92 She argued that the entanglements doctrine 
looked at the effect of the government action rather than the process of it, and 
the effect in question was simply whether the government was advancing or 
inhibiting religion.93 Additionally, she argued that construing the claim as 
“clergy malpractice” was erroneous because “malpractice relies upon 
adherence to profession standards. [But t]here is no need to rely upon any 
‘professional’ clerical standard here to discover the Wilton Congregation’s 
duty in this case.”94 She then implied that the Congregation’s actions went 
 
84.   Id. at 1134, 1136 (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971)). 
85.   Id. at 1135–36. 
86.   Emp’t Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). In Smith, the Supreme Court held that a 
“neutral law of general applicability” is subject to strict scrutiny under the Free Exercise Clause 
only when it also burdens other constitutional protections. Id. at 879–81. This standard was 
superseded federally by statute in 1993 by the Religious Freedom Restoration Act, but it 
remains binding upon state governments. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997). 
87.   Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1135 (N.H. 
2005). 
88.   Id. 
89.   Id. at 1136. 
90.   Id. 
91.   Id. 
92.   Id. at 1134, 1136. 
93.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1134, 1136. 
94.   Id. at 1136. 
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beyond mere failure to adhere to a profession standard, arguing that “just as 
the State may prevent a church from offering human sacrifices, it may protect 
its children against injuries caused by pedophiles by authorizing civil 
damages against a church that knowingly . . . creates a situation in which such 
injuries are likely to occur.”95 This is in line with the findings of courts in 
other states.96 
IV. ANALYSIS: REACHING THE RIGHT RESULT FOR THE RIGHT REASON 
Negligence as a cause of action contains four elements: a duty to conform 
to a standard of conduct, a breach of that duty, actual loss or harm, and a 
showing that the breach was the actual and legal cause of the harm.97 The 
particular focus of Berry was the element of duty. 
When considering the question of duty in the context of Berry and Section 
169-C:29, it is important to distinguish between statutory negligence and 
negligence per se, because New Hampshire recognizes both.98 The key is to 
recognize that a “duty” analysis consists of two parts—the creation or 
recognition of a duty, and the definition of that duty. The recognition of a 
duty’s existence is a question of law.99 If no duty has been previously 
recognized under a specified fact pattern, then one must be created, or no 
negligence suit can be maintained.100 A duty can be created in two ways. The 
first is by statute, which gives rise to an action of statutory negligence.101 In 
New Hampshire, this can only occur if the intent to create a private right of 
action by statute was either expressed or implied by the legislature.102 The 
second method is through the existence of a common law duty as established 
through case precedent.103 This gives rise to a standard negligence action. 
Once the existence of a duty has been established, the inquiry then moves 
to the definition of that duty. Defining a duty means determining the 
standard of conduct to which the defendant must conform under a specified 
set of circumstances.104 This standard can be a matter of either fact or law 
depending on the method used to define it. Once again, there are two ways 
for a duty to be defined—by statute or by case precedent. If the standard of 
 
95.   Id. (citing Malicki v. Doe, 814 So. 2d 347, 360 (Fla. 2002)). 
96.   Morrison v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 473 (Pa. Com. Pl. 2004); 
State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990). 
97.   Kendrick v. East Delavan Baptist Church, 886 F. Supp. 1465, 1472 (E.D. Wis. 1995). 
98.   Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 277 (N.H. 1995). 
99.   Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104 (N.H. 1993). 
100.   Marquay, 662 A.2d at 277.  
101.   Id. 
102.   Id. 
103.   Id. 
104.   Kendrick, 886 F. Supp. at 1472. 
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conduct is established through a statute, then the duty is defined as a matter 
of law and termed negligence per se.105 On the other hand, case precedent 
defines duty as a question of “ordinary care” by a reasonable person, which 
makes the specific standard of conduct a matter of fact.106 
In Berry, the majority correctly dismissed the plaintiffs’ statutory 
negligence claim under Marquay.107 As a result, the question addressed here 
is whether a duty was created under case precedent and common law. While 
the majority was correct in finding that the defendants did not commit a 
nonfeasance, both the majority and dissenting judges failed to recognize that 
the defendants might have been liable for committing a misfeasance. Thus, 
the defendants may have been subject to a duty of general care. If that was 
the case, then the duty would have been either defined by Section 169-C:29 
as negligence per se or sent to the jury as a question of fact. In either case, 
summary judgment should not have been granted for the defendants. 
A. The Limited Nonfeasance Framework 
The New Hampshire rule of negligence in cases such as Berry (alleging a 
duty to report abuse) must recognize the tension between two opposite but 
fundamental principles which underly the rules of negligence. The first is that 
“all persons . . . have a general duty to take reasonable care to not subject 
other persons to an unreasonable risk of harm.”108 This is the principle from 
which all common law duties spring. Every other principle of negligence 
serves only to clarify or limit this first rule. The second principle is that courts 
will generally not force individuals to take affirmative action to prevent harm 
to other persons.109 This, in turn, will often lead courts to conclude that an 
individual does not generally have a duty to act, even if inaction would result 
in harm.110  
The tension between these two principles has arguably given rise to much 
of the modern negligence law. Even today, courts still often distinguish 
between torts of commission (sometimes called misfeasance claims) and torts 
 
105.   Marquay, 662 A.2d at 277 (quoting Bob Godfrey Pontiac, Inc. v. Roloff, 630 P.2d 840, 
845 (Or. 1981)). 
106.   Kendrick, 886 F. Supp. at 1474 (quoting Wisconsin Civil Pattern Jury Instruction 
1005). 
107.   Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1128 (N.H. 
2005). 
108.   Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104 (N.H. 1993). 
109.   Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, Defining the Duty of Religious Institutions to Protect 
Others: Surgical Instruments, Not Machetes, Are Required, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 11, 18 (2005). 
110.   Daniel B. Yeager, A Radical Community of Aid: A Rejoinder to Opponents of 
Affirmative Duties to Help Strangers, 71 WASH. U. L. Q. 1, 13 (1993). 
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of omission (frequently called nonfeasance claims).111 A misfeasance claim 
asserts that the defendant acted in a negligent manner, while a nonfeasance 
claim argues that the defendant did not act, and the inaction itself was 
negligent.112  
It is apparent after even a causal glance that the nonfeasance framework 
carries at least one substantial distinction from the misfeasance framework. 
Specifically, the misfeasance rule creates the duty, while the nonfeasance rule 
abolishes it. The misfeasance framework assumes that, by default, all persons 
possess the duty in question; exceptions tend to exempt certain persons from 
liability. On the other hand, the nonfeasance framework proclaims that no 
person possesses the duty in question; the exceptions tend to subject persons 
to a duty which they would otherwise not possess. 
1. The Creation of an Affirmative Duty to Act 
As a matter of practically applying these two opposing frameworks, courts 
have developed two different ways of articulating when a duty has been 
created. Under the first method, an individual incurs a duty by acting; a 
violation of this duty is classified as a misfeasance.113 In other words, a person 
who acts is subject to the duty to do so in a reasonable manner. On the other 
hand, the nonfeasance framework is an inherently limited one. While a duty 
under the misfeasance framework is the rule, under the nonfeasance 
framework it is the exception. Courts articulate this by stating that an 
affirmative duty to act exists only when the conditions of an exception have 
been met.114 
Thus, a defendant is subject to an affirmative duty to act if circumstances 
meet one of three criteria. These three criteria are (1) the existence of a 
“special relationship” between the parties, (2) the creation of an “especial 
temptation or opportunity for criminal misconduct” by the defendant’s 
inaction, and (3) the voluntary assumption of a duty by the defendant.115 All 
three have a common thread “of interaction or dependency” between the 
parties.116 
 
111.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c. 
112.   E.g., J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 809 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (Nonfeasance is “the 
complete omission or failure to perform,” while misfeasance is “negligent conduct or active 
misconduct”). 
113.   Id. 
114.   Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1128 (N.H. 
2005).  
115.   Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1007 (N.H. 2003). 
116.   J.A.W., 627 N.E.2d at 809. 
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2. Policy Reasons for a Limited Nonfeasance Framework 
The limited nonfeasance framework oftentimes appears heartless, and 
courts have been frequently criticized for it. Even the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts subtly critiques the rule: 
The result of the rule has been a series of older decisions to 
the effect that one human being, seeing a fellow man in dire 
peril . . .  may sit on the dock, smoke his cigar, and watch the 
other drown. Such decisions have been condemned by legal 
writers as revolting in any moral sense, but thus far they 
remain the law.117 
The Restatement (Second) of Torts attributes this rule to history, arguing that 
it came about primarily because “courts were far too much occupied with the 
more flagrant forms of misbehavior to be greatly concerned with one who 
merely did nothing.”118 Other authors—while still critical of the rule—have 
been at least slightly more generous, acknowledging that courts have raised 
other arguments beyond mere history to justify the limits placed on 
nonfeasance liability.119 Courts will defend limits on nonfeasance by asserting 
the importance of individual autonomy, the negative consequences of 
legislating morality, and the importance of foreseeability. 
The importance of individual autonomy is perhaps the most widespread 
rationale given for the limited nonfeasance framework.120 This doctrine may 
carry special weight in American legal thought for two reasons. The first 
reason is that American culture attaches a generally high value to personal 
liberty and independence. The second reason, however, is America’s history 
with slavery. Some legal scholars have pointed out that Americans have more 
of an aversion to the imposition of involuntary servitude than citizens of 
 
117.   RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314 cmt. c. 
118.   Id.  
119.   Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 109 at 18–19 (“courts hold that it is not the place of the 
courts to decide this moral issue [of affirmative duty]; it is better left to a person’s own 
conscience.”); Yeager, supra note 110 at 1 n.1; John G. Culhane, Duty Per Se: Reading Child 
Abuse Statutes to Create a Common Law Duty in Favor of Victims, 19 WIDENER L. REV. 73, 77 
(2013) (A Delaware court held that “liability . . . should be decided by the legislature, because 
that body . . . should make decisions involving social policy.”). 
120.   Yeager, supra note 110 at 1 n.1. New Hampshire has even gone so far as to describe 
the nonfeasance framework as including a balancing test between the plaintiff’s interest in 
avoiding harm and the individual’s interest in avoiding forced liability for inaction—an 
interest that could only come about via an interest in autonomy from state control. Marquay 
v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 279 (N.H. 1995) (citing Libbey v. Hampton Water Works Co., 389 A.2d 
434, 435 (N.H. 1978)). 
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other countries; it seems quite likely that if they are correct, this would stem 
from a feeling of guilt over the involuntary servitude regime (i.e., slavery) that 
was tolerated for so long by so many.121 
Whatever the source of that aversion is, it has caused Americans to 
consider their right to autonomy generally more important than any sort of 
communal obligation.122 This does not, of course, necessitate an inference 
that Americans have no sense of community. Rather, it implies only that 
Americans are left to decide communal obligations themselves as individuals, 
instead of allowing an outside force (i.e., the collective government) to decide 
in their stead.123 
This is most likely related to the second reason for a limited nonfeasance 
framework. Courts and activists assert that imposing a duty to act would be 
legislating morality, and they frequently recoil from the prospect.124 Given 
that the United States was founded in part upon the ideals of freedom of 
conscience, this is not surprising. Morality is dictated by the conscience, and 
so, it comes as no surprise that courts see the legal imposition of moral duties 
as a legal imposition upon the conscience itself. 
The third reason for a limited nonfeasance framework—particularly in 
situations involving criminal conduct such as sexual abuse—may be the close 
ties between duty and foreseeability. Courts will generally refuse to impose a 
duty to prevent unforeseeable conduct.125 Courts also usually presume that 
criminal conduct is generally not foreseeable.126 As a result, where the 
commission of a crime is the alleged consequence of a defendant’s inaction, 
the limited nonfeasance doctrine could provide a convenient method for the 
court to determine whether the defendant is liable, foreseeability 
notwithstanding. 
B. Berry’s Application of the Limited Nonfeasance Framework 
In applying the general rule of duty to the facts of a specific case, the first 
step is to determine if the defendant is accused of acting (also called 
“misfeasance”) or not acting (also called “nonfeasance”).127 If the defendant 
is accused of misfeasance, then he is subject to a general duty to act in 
accordance with a standard of conduct, whether that standard be defined by 
 
121.   Yeager, supra note 110 at 2. 
122.   Id. 
123.   Id. at 13–14. 
124.   Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 109 at 19. 
125.   Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1006 (N.H. 2003).. 
126.   Id. 
127.   J.A.W. v. Roberts, 627 N.E.2d 802, 815 (Ind. Ct. App. 1994) (Sullivan, J., dissenting). 
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statute (negligence per se) or by the common law (ordinary care).128 If, on the 
other hand, the defendant is accused of nonfeasance, then he may only be 
charged with a duty if one of the three conditions are met.129 In Berry, both 
the majority and the dissent skipped over this step of the analysis, and instead 
assumed that the entire case was subject solely to the nonfeasance framework. 
This was perhaps the gravest error committed by both the majority and 
dissent in Berry because it distorted the reasoning of both decisions at a 
fundamental level. The majority was correct in conducting the nonfeasance 
analysis of the case, but it failed to reach a correct disposition of the case by 
failing to see the misfeasance issue. The dissent, on the other hand, reached 
the correct disposition of the common law claim; however, because the 
dissenting Justice also failed to spot the misfeasance issue, her rationale was 
weak and unpersuasive. 
1. The Majority Decision: The Wrong Result for the Wrong 
Reason 
The majority was correct in recognizing that an affirmative duty to act is 
limited to those circumstances where either (1) a special relationship existed 
between the parties, (2) the defendants’ actions created some “special 
temptation or opportunity for criminal misconduct,” or (3) the defendant 
voluntarily assumed the affirmative duty to act.130 Voluntary assumption was 
not raised by the plaintiffs in Berry, so it will not be addressed here.131 
A special relationship would exist only if the defendants “[were] required 
by law to take or . . . voluntarily [took] custody of [the plaintiffs] under 
circumstances such as to deprive [them of] normal opportunities for 
protection.”132 That did not happen in this case, as the plaintiffs’ only 
connection with the defendants was membership in their congregation.133 
The majority’s refusal to recognize a special relationship between clergy and 
the general congregation is in line with precedent from other states.134 
Even in the absence of a special relationship between the parties, a duty to 
act may be created when a defendant’s actions create a special opportunity 
 
128.   Marquay v. Eno, 662 A.2d 272, 277 (N.H. 1995). 
129.   Remsburg, 816 A.2d at 1007. 
130.   Id. 
131.   Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of New York, Inc., 879 A.2d 1124, 1129 (N.H. 
2005). 
132.   Marquay, 662 A.2d at 279. 
133.   Berry¸ 879 A.2d at 1129. 
134.   See Doe v. Liberatore, 478 F. Supp. 2d 742 (M.D. Pa. 2007); see also Fortin v. Roman 
Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208 (Me. 2005). 
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for criminal misconduct. “A party who realizes or should realize that his 
conduct has created a condition which involves an unreasonable risk of harm 
to another has a duty to exercise reasonable care to prevent the risk from 
taking effect.”135 This conduct may include other negligent conduct by the 
alleged tortfeasor.136  
If the inquiry is limited solely to the nonfeasance claim, as the majority’s 
opinion was, then this criterion remains unfulfilled. Silence is not speech, and 
failure to act is not itself an action. Thus, the majority was correct in 
reasoning that mere failure to report cannot create an opportunity for 
criminal misconduct.137 However, the majority then claimed that such special 
circumstances were only created where the defendant had “exercised control 
[over the circumstances].”138 The majority implied that if the defendants in 
Berry had “created a condition or enhanced a foreseeable risk of criminal 
conduct which they could independently and affirmativ[ly] control,” then 
they might be exposed to liability.139 The majority also stated, “[The elders] 
did not create the risk of harm to the children nor control its cessation or 
continuation.”140 It is important to recognize that control of the situation was 
placed in the hands of the elders the moment they were informed of the 
abuse; the abuser was at their mercy to expose or protect.141 Unfortunately, 
the majority did not believe that premise to be true, and therefore they 
concluded that the elders did not create a special circumstance or risk of 
harm.142 
The majority’s analysis was flawed for two reasons. First, the court rooted 
its decision in the rule that no general duty exists to protect a person from 
the criminal acts of a third party.143 This rule, in turn, sprouts straight out of 
the nonfeasance framework. However, although the nonfeasance rule is 
sometimes treated as a standalone basis for liability, it is important to 
remember that the nonfeasance rule is not actually a source of duty—it is a 
limitation of it. By rooting their analysis solely within a doctrine limiting 
liability, the majority risked losing sight of what establishes duty in the first 
place. Unfortunately, this is precisely what happened when the majority 
 
135.   Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106 (N.H. 1993). 
136.   Id. 
137.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1130. 
138.   Id. 
139.   Id. 
140.   Id. 
141.   Id. at 1125–26. 
142.   Id. at 1130–31. 
143.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1128. 
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overlooked the defendants’ decision to threaten Mrs. Poisson into keeping 
her husband’s sexual abuse a secret.144 
This mistake thus assisted in causing the second error that the majority 
committed—it failed to distinguish misfeasance from nonfeasance. Negligent 
failure to report alleges nonfeasance. Willful concealment, on the other hand, 
alleges a misfeasance. Misfeasance is an action, which means it automatically 
creates a duty to act according to a standard of conduct. No special 
relationship is required to find a common law duty on that count. 
It is also worth noting that the majority never explicitly considered the 
plaintiffs’ claim for deceit or willful concealment of abuse. The trial court 
sustained this claim against a summary judgment motion but then dismissed 
it for violation of the Establishment Clause and penitent-clerical privilege 
under the New Hampshire Rules of Evidence.145 The majority acknowledged 
the filing of the claim and the circumstances surrounding it (namely, the 
pressure exerted by the elders upon Mrs. Poisson to keep silent).146 Further, 
this claim was kept alive through an appeal of the First Amendment question 
raised by the plaintiffs.147 However, aside from a brief mention of the claim 
in the procedural history, any analysis of it is entirely absent from the 
majority opinion in Berry.148 The omission is very abnormal, especially 
considering that the majority declined to engage in the First Amendment 
analysis because the trial court’s decision on all counts was affirmed, “albeit 
for different reasons.”149 
This was another serious misstep by the Berry majority. Rule 505 and the 
First Amendment were the only grounds given by the trial court for 
dismissing the claim for deceit, and the plaintiffs raised that issue at the 
appellate level.150 Because the claim of deceit was never addressed by the 
majority, Rule 505 and the First Amendment were still the only grounds for 
barring the claim, and the majority never ruled on that question presented 
for appeal. Failing to consider that question was an error because it weighs 
heavily on the question of misfeasance.151 
 
144.   Id. at 1129. 
145.   Id. at 1126; N.H. R. EVID. 505. 
146.   Berry v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y of N.Y, Inc., No. 01-C-0318, 2003 WL 
25739777 (N.H. Super. Nov. 04, 2003). 
147.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1125–26. 
148.   Id. at 1126. 
149.   Id. at 1131. 
150.   Berry, 2003 WL 25739777. 
151.   See infra Section IV.C.1. 
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2. The Dissent: The Right Result, But Still for the Wrong 
Reason 
Justice Dalianis’s opinion was largely correct in its conclusions and 
preferred disposition of the case. However, the reasoning that she relied on 
in reaching those conclusions did contain several flaws, including her 
reliance upon precedent of a dubious nature. This most likely had a 
significant impact on the majority’s rejection of her ultimate position. 
Justice Dalianis rested the majority of her position on the doctrine of 
overriding foreseeability, which she cited as a fourth exception to the generally 
limited nonfeasance framework.152 The overriding foreseeability exception 
holds, in essence, that a landlord may be liable for foreseeable criminal acts, 
even if there was no physical or security defect which satisfies the hazardous 
circumstances exception.153 According to Justice Dalianis, the overriding 
foreseeability exception was folded into the hazardous circumstances 
exception in Remsburg v. Docusearch.154 
The only problem is that the case Justice Dalianis uses to provide the 
overriding foreseeability exception—Walls v. Oxford Management Co.—
“reject[ed] liability based solely . . . on a doctrine of overriding 
foreseeability.”155 The doctrine is further complicated because the court 
arguably relied upon that “rejected” doctrine seven years later in Iannelli v. 
Burger King Corp.156 However, that case is an outlier; Justice Dalianis herself 
admits that “the status of the overriding foreseeability exception in our case 
law is not clear.”157 
There is no question that Walls had explicitly rejected liability based solely 
on overriding foreseeability.158 There is also little question, upon reading 
Iannelli, that liability, in that case, was based solely upon the foreseeability of 
harm.159 Justice Dalianis took this contradiction in the court’s precedent to 
mean that a lack of conduct could still create a hazardous circumstance if the 
harm was sufficiently foreseeable.160 However, this would mean outright 
ignoring Walls, which was a step that the majority was not willing to take. 
 
152.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1131–32 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
153.   Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 106 (N.H. 1993). 
154.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1132. 
155.   Walls, 633 A.2d at 107. 
156.   Iannelli v. Burger King Corp., 761 A.2d 417, 420 (N.H. 2000). See Berry, 879 A.2d at 
1132. 
157.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1132. 
158.   Walls, 633 A.2d at 107. 
159.   Iannelli, 761 A.2d at 420–21. 
160.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1133. 
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This skepticism was attached to her overall conclusion and caused the 
majority to distinguish Iannelli by arguing that the key factor in Ianelli was 
whether the defendant(s) “exercised control . . . [or] created a condition or 
enhanced a foreseeable risk of criminal conduct which they could 
independently and affirmatively control.”161 Although Justice Dalianis sought 
to rebut this by accusing the majority of making a “retrospective statement 
of the law,” the damage was done.162 The disagreement over the “overriding 
foreseeability” doctrine should have been irrelevant because the plaintiffs also 
accused the defendants of actually unjustly exerting control to conceal the 
abuse. Instead, the presupposition that the nonfeasance framework was the 
only applicable theory limited the discussion.163  
This fixation on nonfeasance by Justice Dalianis was even more ironic, 
given that Justice Dalianis still argued that the defendants acted by advising 
Mrs. Poisson.164 While Justice Dalianis identified the defendants’ alleged 
concealment as a significant event, she misunderstood its significance by 
failing to recognize it as potential misfeasance.165 Instead, she alluded to the 
“active[] facilitate[ion of] the continuing abuse” as “giving bad advice.”166 
This was a gross understatement, and completely ignored the plaintiffs’ claim 
for willful concealment of abuse.167 
Justice Dalianis’s Establishment Clause analysis also bears a need for 
examination. The defendants argued that liability would violate the famous 
Lemon test by excessively entangling the courts with the affairs of their 
congregation.168 Justice Dalianis disagreed.169 She argued that the excessive 
entanglements doctrine was merely one part of the inquiry into whether the 
 
161.   Id. at 1130 (majority opinion). 
162.   Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
163.   Id. at 1130 (majority opinion). 
164.   Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
165.   Id. at 1133–34 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
166.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1133–34. 
167.   The majority also referred to the elders’ conduct as “failure to dispense proper advice.” 
Id. at 1130 (majority opinion). The exercise in vocabulary that phrases misfeasance as an 
omission of a response is a frequent result of clever lawyers using rhetorical trickery to 
obfuscate the difference between commission and omission. See Saul Levmore, Waiting for 
Rescue: An Essay on the Evolution and Incentive Structure of the Law of Affirmative Obligations, 
72 VA. L. REV. 879 (1986) (“The clever law student is even able to turn commissions into 
omissions by arguing, for example, that negligent driving is nothing more than the failure to 
brake.”). 
168.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1136 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
169.   Id. 
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government action advanced or inhibited religion.170 In other words, she 
argued that as long as imposing a duty would not advance or inhibit religion, 
the entanglement was not excessive. 
Justice Dalianis’s casual dismissing of what the Supreme Court has 
described as a separate element is concerning. Although the Supreme Court 
did state that entanglement is significant because it has bearing on the effect 
of a statute, nowhere did the Court say that it should merge with one of the 
previous two elements.171 The Court’s statement regarding the purpose of the 
entanglement analysis explained why the element was important, not how to 
resolve whether the element was present.172 The accuracy of Justice Dalianis’s 
conclusion is beyond the scope of this Note. Nevertheless, it should be noted 
that, regardless of whether her conclusion was correct, her reasoning was not 
sound.  
On the other hand, Justice Dalianis’s discussion of the trial court’s claim 
that the plaintiffs were alleging “clerical malpractice” (which, the trial court 
argued, meant that it should be dismissed) consisted of some solid 
reasoning.173 Unfortunately, a flaw in her underlying perspective of the case 
undermined her argument once more. She noted that malpractice inherently 
requires measurement against a professional standard and that malpractice 
does not exist where the standard is ordinary negligence.174 While this is true, 
it still misses the point of the plaintiffs’ allegations, and thus reaches only half 
the issue. Their claim for willful concealment alleges not only that the elders 
were negligent, but also that they acted intending to inflict a certain harm (a 
lack of intervention by others who arguably had a duty to intervene).175 An 
allegation of intentional deceit is hardly an allegation of malpractice because 
it is a standard that applies far beyond any particular profession. To recognize 
this, though, would first require Justice Dalianis to have addressed the claim 
of deceit in the first place. This was something that she failed to do; as a result, 
her argument was neither as forceful nor as persuasive as it could have been. 
 
 
 
170.   Id. 
171.   Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 232–33 (1997). 
172.   Id. It is notable that the Court, immediately after saying that entanglement should be 
treated as assisting in the effects analysis, then proceeded to analyze entanglement as its own 
element rather than relying upon the conclusion of the effects analysis. Id. 
173.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1136. 
174.   Id. 
175.   Id. at 1129–30 (majority opinion). 
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C. Analyzing Berry’s Rationale Under a Misfeasance Framework 
The Berry majority held that because the plaintiffs’ allegations rested solely 
on the defendants’ failure to report the abuse, they were only alleging 
nonfeasance.176 The majority also held that the plaintiffs failed to meet an 
exception to the limited nonfeasance rule and that the defendants, therefore, 
owed no duty of affirmative action to the plaintiffs.177 Relying on those 
holdings, the majority affirmed the dismissal of all claims by the plaintiffs.178 
However, the majority could only reach that result by ignoring the 
defendants’ willful concealment of the abuse suffered by the plaintiffs. The 
plaintiffs had a claim for misfeasance against the defendants because of that 
willful action. Additionally, that misfeasance opened the door to hold the 
defendants liable for nonfeasance as well. 
1. Implying a General Duty of Care in Berry 
The plaintiffs’ count of misfeasance will be addressed first—that is, the 
count of “willful concealment” (or, as the trial court termed it, “deceit”).179 
The basic principle of misfeasance is that when a person acts, they acquire a 
duty to act with reasonable care.180 Thus, when a plaintiff alleges that a person 
has acted without reasonable care, they have a common law action for 
negligence. In such a misfeasance case, the question of whether the 
defendant’s action was reasonable or not is typically a question of fact left up 
to the jury to decide.181 Therefore, if the defendants in Berry did act—i.e., if 
misfeasance was alleged—then the court should have left the matter to the 
jury. The fact that the trial court only dismissed the claim for willful 
concealment of abuse after the defendants raised an Establishment Clause 
challenge supports this conclusion.182 
The result differs because the analysis acknowledges that in alleging that 
the defendants engaged in willful concealment by pressuring Mrs. Poisson 
from contacting the authorities, the plaintiffs alleged that the defendants 
acted.183 The moment the defendants did so, they created a duty for 
themselves to, at the very least, take reasonable care to not subject another 
person to an unreasonable risk of harm by their actions.  
 
176.   Id. at 1130. 
177.   Id. at 1130–31. 
178.   Id. at 1131. 
179.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1126. 
180.   Walls v. Oxford Mgmt. Co., 633 A.2d 103, 104 (N.H. 1993). 
181.   Id. 
182.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1126 (majority opinion). 
183.   Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
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Whether or not their advice to conceal the abuse was reasonable is not a 
question of law, but is a question of fact. The standard applied by the jury, in 
that case, would be either negligence per se (under Section 169-C:29) or 
ordinary care. Under either standard, the defendants arguably acted 
unreasonably, and they breached their duty by threatening Mrs. Poisson with 
eternal damnation if she asked the authorities to rescue her daughters from 
her husband.184 
Neither the majority nor the dissent recognized that this was the proper 
standard to apply. The resulting confusion set the stage for an erroneous 
analysis of the common law negligence count. 
2. Reapplying a Nonfeasance Analysis in Light of Misfeasance 
The majority concluded that the defendants did not have a duty to report 
because they did not fall under any of the three exceptions to the limited 
nonfeasance framework.185 According to the majority, they did not have a 
special relationship with the plaintiffs; they did not by their conduct create a 
hazardous circumstance or special opportunity for criminal activity; and they 
did not voluntarily assume a duty to report abuse.186 Justice Dalianis 
disagreed, but only because she believed that even inaction could create a 
hazardous circumstance if the risk of harm was sufficiently foreseeable.187 
This reasoning—both in its conclusions and its limits—could only be 
sustained by assuming that the defendants never acted. However, the 
defendants did act by threatening the plaintiffs’ mother into silence.188 Such 
an action constitutes conduct, which rebuts the majority’s main premise; it 
also eliminates the need for the suspect “overriding foreseeability” doctrine 
used by Justice Dalianis.  
Instead, the defendants committed a tort of misfeasance. This tort of 
misfeasance created a circumstance in which a previously committed crime 
could reoccur—repeatedly. This circumstance fits quite neatly within the 
hazardous circumstances exception to the limited nonfeasance framework. 
Essentially, by actively working to cut-off the plaintiffs from any avenue of 
assistance, the defendants incurred upon themselves a duty to provide the 
assistance they were attempting to prevent. This establishes a common law 
duty by the defendants to report the abuse to the authorities. Whether that 
duty was defined by Section 169-C:29 or by the common law standard of 
 
184.   Id. at 1129 (majority opinion). 
185.   Id. at 1128–31. 
186.   Id. 
187.   Id. at 1133 (Dalianis, J., dissenting). 
188.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1129 (majority opinion). 
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ordinary care—i.e., whether the duty was common law negligence or 
negligence per se—would be a question for the court to decide, but the duty 
did exist. As a result, dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims for want of a common 
law duty was improper. 
From one perspective, this does not impose a new cause of action at 
common law for failure to report abuse—instead, it analyzes the facts in Berry 
under the standard negligence framework. If a court insisted on dubbing it a 
new cause of action, however, it would be strictly limited to imposing a duty 
to report abuse upon religious organizations—or, really, any other person—
who had taken active steps to prevent other people with knowledge of the 
abuse from reporting it to the proper authorities. 
D. Policy Implications of Applying a Misfeasance Framework to Berry 
Analyzing the Berry situation under a standard negligence framework 
ensures that the doctrine will not get carried away. It also ensures that this 
doctrine is not a “loophole” to be used by unscrupulous attorneys to achieve 
damage rewards that would otherwise be barred by the limited nonfeasance 
framework. More importantly, however, it also leaves the policy goals of the 
limited nonfeasance doctrine intact. 
Three specific policy goals prominently underlie the limited nonfeasance 
doctrine. 189 Courts do not wish to override individual autonomy and make 
all persons, everywhere, subject to government controls on their behavior.190 
A closely related (but not identical) policy is the reluctance of courts to 
impose or legislate morality from the bench.191 Finally, courts are very 
reluctant to punish people for the consequences of their acts that could not 
be foreseen.192 The Berry analysis proposed here does not violate any of these 
rationales. 
First, it does not override individual autonomy. The only reason that an 
individual would be subjected to an affirmative requirement to act is to 
prevent harm inflicted by his own actions. This is a duty which society 
already imposes; it is also one that courts have not been averse to enforcing. 
This paradigm recognizes that an individual’s autonomy will be overridden 
by the courts only after that defendant has overridden the autonomy of the 
victim or a victim’s would-be helper. This limitation on a failure to report 
litigation already exists within the existing misfeasance/nonfeasance 
framework, but is often overlooked. 
 
189.   See supra at IV.A.2. 
190.   See supra at IV.A.2. 
191.   See supra at IV.A.2. 
192.   See supra at IV.A.2. 
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Second, this analysis means that courts will not be legislating morality. 
Rather, they will be providing remedies where there was an actual infliction 
of injury. Where a potential defendant merely fails to report ongoing abuse, 
he is technically not inflicting the injury himself. Instead, he is merely 
standing by as someone else inflicts the injury. Although such a scenario is 
morally abhorrent, the courts will not intervene. Where they will intervene, 
however, is where the defendant acts to encourage or protect the individual 
inflicting the harm. Where that happens, the defendant is now actively 
helping to inflict the injuries. This is no longer a matter of mere morality, but 
a question of whether the law will provide a remedy for the very thing it exists 
to prevent. Providing a remedy under such circumstances is not legislating 
morality. Therefore, the proposed analysis does not violate this policy, either. 
The third policy is one of not punishing people for the unforeseeable 
criminal acts of others. As before, analyzing failure to report cases to 
determine if misfeasance took place does not impede or violate this policy. If 
anything, it helps to enforce it by tying a duty to report abuse to actions meant 
to prevent others from reporting it. Such actions act as a proxy, attesting to 
the state of mind, which knows that the abuse has happened and is likely to 
happen again. Additionally, it subjects a duty to the “creation of a risk of 
harm” element of the limited nonfeasance framework, which itself inherently 
includes the element of foreseeability. 
Tying failure-to-report cases to acts of misfeasance in the common law is 
certainly no substitute for legislative action. However, it allows courts to 
pursue their policy goals while also providing justice for victims who would 
otherwise be left without a remedy. It would require careful analysis on the 
part of both attorneys and judges. However, although the American legal 
system might perhaps be justified in recoiling from vagueness or 
uncertainties, it should not shrink from solutions simply because they require 
attention to detail. In the hands of conscientious litigators and jurists, this 
proposed analysis provides a balanced approach and it ensures that courts 
can provide justice without compromising the principles undergirding the 
rules of the common law. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The majority opinion in Berry feared that penalizing “mere failure . . . to 
report . . . [or] improper advice” would unreasonably extend liability.193 But 
tortious misfeasance is not “mere” anything, and conceding that the 
defendants’ misfeasance here created a special opportunity for sexual abuse 
would not have unreasonably extended liability to any circumstance it had 
 
193.   Berry, 879 A.2d at 1130.  
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not already reached. The majority erred because it did not recognize this fact, 
and the plaintiffs once again suffered the consequences of another’s refusal 
to intervene on their behalf. 
Further research on Berry and the questions it raises is encouraged. In 
particular, the First Amendment analysis used by both the trial court and 
Justice Dalianis’s dissenting opinion requires more analysis. The attempted 
(and successful) use of Lemon as a shield against misfeasance liability by the 
defendants in Berry was disconcerting, and other courts have found that the 
Establishment Clause does not prevent courts from holding churches liable 
for failure to report abuse.194 Although that topic is outside the scope of this 
Note, an analysis synthesizing the reasoning of those courts would be a timely 
addition to this developing area of tort law. 
 
 
194.   See, e.g., Morrison v. Diocese of Altoona-Johnstown, 68 Pa. D. & C.4th 473 (Pa. Com. 
Pl. 2004); State v. Motherwell, 788 P.2d 1066 (Wash. 1990). 
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